#安全/对齐

After the Hugging Face incident, we committed to conducting a much broader review of actions taken by our models during training and evaluation and to being transparent about our findings. This is an extensive review that is ongoing. The vast majority of actions we’ve reviewed were completions of mundane research tasks, such as accessing publicly available web content to answer questions. Our investigation focuses on instances where agents interacted with third-party websites in ways that went beyond their assigned tasks or intended methods. Most cases identified so far have been lower severity, with limited or no evidence of meaningful impact to the third-party service. While our review is underway, we want to share more about this work and make sure people understand our disclosure process and notifications to affected third parties. Given the scale of the review required, and the need to assess each case, we expect this work will take months to complete. https://openai.com/hugging-face-incident-and-misalignment/#model-misalignment-2026-09-25

I’ve joined @thinkymachines to work on safety & alignment. The default trajectory is that as AI gets more powerful, control over it will concentrate in the hands of a few. I’d rather build safety systems that let control over AI be shared widely. Longer thoughts below.

Security is strongest when organizations collaborate openly and move quickly. Now over 120 members strong, the Open Secure AI Alliance is sharing new open source security contributions, including new proposed SAFE guidelines, for turning confidential incident findings into stronger protection across the ecosystem.

Releasing weights indiscriminately isn't safe. Neither is keeping capable models inside a few labs. We think there's a path between them. We haven't mapped all of it. Our new post covers the part we can see: how we assessed Inkling, and why access should widen in stages. https://thinkingmachines.ai/blog/a-safe-path-to-open-weights

🚨 CRITICAL: Active supply chain attack on axios -- one of npm's most depended-on packages. The latest axios@1.14.1 now pulls in plain-crypto-js@4.2.1, a package that did not exist before today. This is a live compromise. This is textbook supply chain installer malware. axios has 100M+ weekly downloads. Every npm install pulling the latest version is potentially compromised right now. Socket AI analysis confirms this is malware. plain-crypto-js is an obfuscated dropper/loader that: • Deobfuscates embedded payloads and operational strings at runtime • Dynamically loads fs, os, and execSync to evade static analysis • Executes decoded shell commands • Stages and copies payload files into OS temp and Windows ProgramData directories • Deletes and renames artifacts post-execution to destroy forensic evidence If you use axios, pin your version immediately and audit your lockfiles. Do not upgrade.